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DEFICIT F I N A N C I N G IN PAKISTAN 
(1951-52 to 1959-60) 
The present study seeks to estimate the level and rate of deficit 
financing in Pakistan during 1951-52 to 1959-60, to explore the im-
pact of deficit financing on the money supply and the inflationary 
situation in the country, and to define the safe limits of deficit financ-
ing for the future in the light of past experience. 
The study has been divided into four parts. Part I deals with the 
measurement of deficit financing. The various concepts of deficit 
financing are defined and the justification of using these concepts 
are discussed in the context of the prevalent practice in other coun-
tries. The methodology of calculating deficit financing is then set 
out in detail. To bring out some important features of the rate of 
deficit financing during this period, a distinction is made between 
the pre-Plan period (1951-52 to 1954-55) and the Plan period (1955-56 
to 1959-60). 
Part II explores the impact of deficit financing on money supply 
via the banking system. An attempt is made to derive theoretical 
credit-creation coefficients for Pakistan. The actual coefficients are 
also calculated for 1951-60, and an explanation of the amount, and 
types, of credit created is sought in the nature of the banking system 
of Pakistan. 
Part III discusses the possibility of defining safe, non-inflationary 
limits of money supply expansion. 
Part IV indicates two ways in which the safe limits of deficit 
financing can be estimated, analyses that method used in the Second 
Five Year Plan, and discusses the reasons for the Planning Commis-
sion's choice. 
PART I 
MEASUREMENT OF DEFICIT FINANCING 
1. Concepts of Deficit Financing 
It would be difficult to find a universally acceptable concept of 
deficit financing. Different countries use widely different measures 
in practice. Similarly, different analysts have used different defini-
tions, depending upon the purpose and scope of their studies. What 
is important, however, is to indicate clearly what concept is being 
used in a particular study and why, rather than to carry out a futile 
search for an ideal concept. 
Deficit financing is usually identified with budgetary deficits but 
difficulties immediately arise because of the different connotations 
given to the term "budgetary deficits". In some countries, budget 
deficits are taken to mean deficits on current (or "revenue") account 
(as in Great Britain); in others, they represent the excess of total 
budget expenditure (both on capital and current accounts) over total 
budget receipts (as in U.S.A.). In the post-Keynesian era, these 
budget deficits have come to be analysed with respect to the infla-
tionary or deflationary impact of a change in the public debt (defined 
to include the change in government cash balances). In the Keynesian 
approach, even the symmetry between expenditures and receipts dis-
appears (through the balanced-budget multiplier), and the budgetary 
deficit gives only an imperfect indication of the effect of government 
fiscal operations on aggregate demand. The chief merit of the Key-
nesian approach lies in underlining the point that deficit financing is 
an aggregative concept, indicating an overall imbalance between 
ex-ante national income and ex-ante national expenditure—not merely 
an imbalance in government accounts—so that the method of financing 
(whether direct or indirect taxation or borrowing from the public or 
the banks) cannot by itself form the basis of any quantitative assess-
ment of inflationary or deflationary tendencies in the country. 
Two concepts of deficit financing have been chosen in this study, 
each more narrow than the various concepts mentioned above. The 
first definition of deficit financing is the net borrowing of the government 
from the banking system. This includes borrowings from the State 
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Bank and the commercial banks 1 but excludes borrowings from non-
bank institutions (such as insurance companies, trusts, local bodies, 
joint stock companies, etc.) and f rom individuals.2 The second defini-
tion of deficit financing is the net borrowing of the government from the 
State Bank alone. The mechanism of borrowing may be an increase 
in permanent debt, floating debt, treasury bills or running down of 
cash balances. 
The significance of these definitions lies in linking deficit financing 
directly with the money-creatjn^_efi£gtS-QfLgovernrrient operations. 
By studying how far the Government has been responsible for expand-
ing the flow of new money into the economy, it is possible to asses? 
the influence of government operations in generating inflationary 
pressures. From the analytical point of view, it would have been 
better if government operations could be studied in relation to total 
national expenditure and income but the available data prohibits em-
pirical analysis on these lines. National accounts in Pakistan are frag-
mentary and inadequate, particularly in respect of private consump-
tion expenditure. Moreover, to the extent that an increase in money 
supply may be taken as an approximation to the increase in money 
income expenditure, a causative analysis of the increase in money 
supply (and the government's contribution to this increase) will 
indicate the inflationary pressures attendant to the government 's 
fiscal operations. 
The question is often raised which of the two definitions of deficit 
financing here given is preferable, or in other words, whether borrow-
ings from the central bank should be treated identically with borrow-
ingsfromthecommercialbanksinthe measurement of deficit financing. 3 
In a banking system without excess "pr imary" reserves (i.e., cash plus 
State Bank deposits), borrowing from the central bank increases these 
reserves of commercial banks and hence may lead to an expansion 
of the money supply, whereas borrowing f rom the commercial banks 
1. Or "Scheduled" banks. The two terms are nearly synonymous in Pakistan, 
and are used interchangeably in this monograph. 
2. The first definition employed in this study is also being used by the Plan-
ning Commission and the State Bank which facilitates comparison of results. 
For instance, in India 's Five Year Plan, the second definition of deficit 
financing is used, except that no adjustment is made for the net position of counter-
part funds. 
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cannot. However, to the extent that the restraining factor on com-
merical bank expansion of credit is either "secondary" reserves (or 
"liquidity", i.e., cash, State Bank deposits plus government securities) 
or the absence of possible credit-worthy loans, the first definition of 
deficit financing (total borrowing from the banking system) is more 
\relevant. In Appendix E, these differences are shown in detail and 
Ithe assumptionsunderlyingtheanalysis of bothParts I and II are given. 
For present purposes, the chief conclusion of Appendix E may be 
stated: for purposes of monetary analysis, either of the two definitions 
of deficit-finance may be relevant depending upon the circumstances,4 
2. Method of Estimation 
According to the above two definitions, estimates of deficit 
financing are prepared for 1951-52 to 1959-60. It is not possible to 
carry the estimates back to the time of partition because of inadequacy 
of published data. However, the period covered by the study is long 
enough to yield interesting conclusions regarding the trends of deficit 
financing in Pakistan during the last nine years. 
It is not possible to calculate deficit financing directly because the 
details of government borrowing, according to the source of borrow-
ing, are not now published. An indirect estimate can, however, be 
made by analysing the "causative" factors of money supply changes 
f rom the published balance sheets of the State Bank and the commer-
cial banks (in the annual Report on Currency and Finance, Department 
of Research, State Bank of Pakistan). As a result, the quantities here 
called "deficit financing" may not be correctly titled. Deficit financing 
(first definition) is measured by the change in the banking system's 
holdings of government securities. Should the non-bank public sell to 
(or buy from) the banking system government securities in a given 
year, this would alter our measure of "deficit financing". Similarly, 
under the second definition, open-market operations, intended or 
unintended (because of a pegged interest rate), would affect its mea-
surement. Perhaps it would be less misleading to relabel the first and 
second definitions of "deficit finance" as, respectively, "change in the 
4. What is meant by saying that a definition of deficit financing is " re levant" 
is that the function which predicts, (or explains or causes) changes in money 
supply depends upon deficit financing by that definition. 
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net liability of governments to the banking system" and "change in the 
net liability of governments to the State Bank of Pakistan". This 
change of nomenclature is not made because the largest part of these 
changes of liability has in fact resulted from the incurrence of new 
debt by governments. 
3. Analysis of "Causative Factors'' 
From the combined balance sheet of the banking system, the 
expansion or contraction of the money supply can be analysed in terms 
of the "causative" changes of (1) the private sector, (2) the government 
sector, and (3) the foreign sector to such expansion or contraction. 
The technique of analysing the changes of money supply in terms of 
its "causative" (or compensating or offsetting) factors can be seen in 
the balance sheets of the State Bank and of the commercial banks. 
State Bank Commercial Banks 
Assets Liabilities Assets Liabilities 
Foreign Ex-
change = F 
Reserves of 
Banks = R 
Currency = C 
Reserves = R 
Demand De-
posits = D 
Government 
Securities 
plus loans 
less deposits 
- G 2 
Notes in circu-
lation = N 
Government: 
Securities plus 
loans = G1-G2 
Time Deposits 
= T 
Other Assets 
less other 
liabilities = A 
Other Deposits*: 
= S 
Private Advan-
ces plus Se-
curities = L 
Other Assets 
less other 
Liabilities = X 
•Includes all deposits in State Bank that are (1) not bank deposits, (2) not 
government deposits, and (3) included in the definition of money supply. 
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The subscripts to the symbol G are added in such a way that G i is 
the sum of all past deficit financing under the first definition and G2 
the sum under the second definition. Since the balance sheets must 
balance, there are two accounting identities: 
(1) F + G 2 + A = R + N + S 
(2) C + R + G j — G 2 + L + X = D + T 
The definition of the money supply (used by the State Bank): 
(3) M = N + J — C - f D + S 
where M is money supply and J coinage in circulation (also included 
in J are Treasury notes). Substitute the accounting identities (1) and 
(2), into the money supply definition (3): 
M = ( L - T ) + ( G 1 ) + ( F ) + ( A + J + X ) 
and also:' 
AM = A(T-—T)+ A(GI)+ A(F)+ A(A+J+X) 
where A represents "change o f " over a year.5 The expression in the 
first parenthesis is the "contribution" to money supply of the private 
sector; in the second parenthesis of the government sector; in the 
third parenthesis of the foreign sector; and in the fourth parenthesis 
of "other items". The details and difficulties of the actual calculation 
of each sector's "contribution" will be discussed in the succeeding 
three paragraphs. 
1. The private sector contribution to money supply consists of 
the commercial bank's advances and bills of the private sector plus 
holdings of private securities. Since time deposits are not usually 
included in the money supply, they are subtracted to obtain the net 
contribution of the private sector. Inadequacies in the published 
5. A G J is therefore deficit financing during that year under the first defini-
tion, A G 2 under the second. 
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data on the Scheduled Banks impose certain statistical problems. It 
is not possible to segregate banks' loans to the government sector from 
total bills and advances. Some data are available, from 1956, on the 
change in advances to governments and this has been used; but, for 
1951-55, the banks' loans to the government sector are per force in-
cluded in the private sector figures. The resulting distortion is not 
expected to be serious, however, because banks' loans to the gov-
ernment sector are believed to have been rather small during the 
early years of the 1950's.6 Also for the years before 1954, it is im-
possible to separate private f rom government securities holdings; since 
the former are relatively small, they are assumed zero (or constant) 
for 1951 through 1953. 
2. In the case of the government sector, the position is even 
more difficult since data (though always available on the State Bank's 
loans to government) are given only after 1953 on commercial banks' 
investments in government securities, and are never directly obtain-
able for State Bank holdings of government securities. For 1951 
through 1953, Scheduled Banks' holdings of government securities are 
estimated as a residual item on their balance sheets, which means that 
the figures unavoidably include private securities and other miscellane-
ous assets.7 The estimates of State Bank investment in government 
securities are obtained indirectly by taking the total assets of the State 
Bank (excluding loans to Scheduled Banks and to governments) and 
subtracting total foreign exchange reserves. This figure is in error only 
to the small extent that the State Bank holds (or changes its holdings 
of) assets other than foreign exchange, government securities and 
loans, and loans to commercial banks. The direct effect of the gov-
ernment sector on the money supply is then found by subtracting 
government deposits from this total of government loans and securities 
k 
6. Since most of the analysis is of changes, it is really the changes in bank 
loans to government that determine the distortion. But the changes will also be 
small if the s h e is. 
7. Some idea of the error involved by such a procedure is gained by conti-
nuing the estimates af ter 1954 (when correct data are available for checking). 
The estimates are always 15-25% too high but changes in securities holding may 
be estimated reasonably well: on an average annual rise of 88.5 million rupees 
(over 1954-1959), the estimates are in error by 7, 5, 89, 25, and 66 million rupees, 
respectively. 
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in the banking system.8 Counterpart funds are treated as a part of 
the cash balances of the government. 
3. The impact of the foreign sector on money supply comes via 
changes in foreign exchange reserves. An accumulation of reserves 
increases money supply by an equivalent amount since it means that 
the economy has decided to exchange its claim on foreign resources 
for an equivalent amount of domestic resources, and vice versa. The 
data on total gold, dollar and sterling reserves have also been obtained 
from the Currency and Finance Reports of the State Bank. In addi-
tion to these reserves, there are certain foreign exchange balances 
placed at the disposal of commercial banks which are authorized to 
deal in foreign exchange. These are known as "authorized dealers' 
balances"; any change in these affects money supply in a similar 
manner as changes in foreign exchange reserves. It is not possible 
to obtain information about these balances so that, by implication, 
these are included under "other items" in our analysis. The amounts 
involved are believed to be small so that our estimates are not seriously 
affected by this omission. 
The detailed tables prepared for each year, covering the period 
1951-52 to 1959-60, are set out in Appendix A. Appendix B gives an 
exact account of how the two sets of deficit financing figures were 
calculated from the Currency and Finance Reports. 
4. Comparison with State Bank Figures 
The State Bank also publishes a causative analysis of money 
supply, though it is not in as detailed a form as presented here and 
covers only the period from 1953-54 to 1958-59 on a "trade year" basis 
(July-June), and 1955-56 to 1959-60 on the old fiscal year basis (April-
March). The State Bank has access to primary data not available in the 
preparation of this study so that the final estimates of deficit financing 
are somewhat different. A comparative statement of State Bank 
estimates and the estimates made in this study is given in Appendix C. 
8. Thus, the first definition of deficit financing (net borrowing f rom the 
banking system) is relevant to a "causat ive" analysis of the money supply and its 
changes. As will be seen in Part II, however, the second definition may have 
greater explanatory value. 
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The main differences are: (1) the State Bank excludes from the domes-
tic private sector the loans made by the commercial banks to the Gov-
ernment which are included, for some years, in this study for lack of 
relevant information; (2) information is available to the State Bank, 
but not released, regarding State Bank investment in Government 
securities and position of counterpart funds so that indirect estimates 
are made in this study; and (3) separate figures are available to the 
State Bank, but not released, for authorized dealers' balances so that 
they become a part of other unexplained items in this study. These 
differences are not negligible: whereas the State Bank estimates deficit 
financing (by the first definition) at 1447 million rupees for 1955-56 to 
1958-59, it is estimated at 1685 million rupees in this study for the 
corresponding period (cf Appendix C). Clearly, it would be possible 
to arrive at more refined estimates if the State Bank were to publish 
more of the primary data. 
5. Estimates of Deficit Financing 
To bring out some of the salient features of deficit financing 
during this period, it is convenient to separate the pre-Plan period 
(1951-52 to 1954-55) from the Plan period (1955-56 to 1959-60). A 
conscious effort to accelerate the pace of economic development 
came with the launching of the First Five Year Plan in 1955-56; it is 
interesting to analyse the way deficit financing responded to this 
economic policy. Table 1 below gives estimates of deficit financing 
during 1951-52 to 1959-60, sub-divided into pre-Plan and Plan periods. 
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TABLE I 
Deficit Financing in the Pre-Plan and Plan Periods 
(million rupees) 
Government Sector 
Deficit Financing 
Year Change in — — Private Foreign Other 
July-June Money From (From Sector Sector Items 
Supply Banks SBP) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Pre-Plan Period: 
1951-52 ... 154 378 (406) 264 —467 —21 
1952-53 ... 57 655 (525) —185 —377 —36 
1953-54 ... 262 247 (188) 4 —38 50 
1954-55 ... 263 208 (153) 9 66 —21 
Average pre-
Plan: 184 372 (318) 23 —204 —7 
Plan period: 
1955-56 ... 653 336 (241) —13 354 —23 
1956-57 ... 454 418 (431) 232 —194 2 
1957-58 ... 351 769 (534) —90 —320 —7 
1958-59 ... 198 162 (—34) —57 163 —70 
1959-60 ... 296 —12 ( - 7 7 ) 165 188 —45 
Average Plan: 390 335 (219) 47 38 —29 
Column (2) is deficit financing by the first definition; column (3) by the 
second. The sum of columns (2), (4), (5), and (6) equals column (1) (except 
for rounding errors). 
The annual rate of deficit financing, during 1951-52 to 1959-60, 
has been about 350 million rupees by the first definition and 260 
million by the second definition. Actually, by either measure, deficit 
financing on the average, is higher for the pre-Plan period than for the 
Plan period. This is an impor tant conclusion of this study which has 
not generally been realized and which has significance for the analysis 
of current inflationary pressures. Deficit financing seems to have been 
fairly evenly spread out in the pre-Plan period whereas it is concen-
trated in the first three years of the Plan period. As the new govern-
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ment took over in October 1958 and committed itself publicly to a 
policy of checking "excessive" deficit financing in country, the rate of 
deficit financing slackened perceptibly, with the result that there was a 
retirement of State Bank-held debt in both 1958-59 and 1959-60 and 
the amount of debt held by the entire banking system was reduced in 
1959-60 (for the first time in the decade). 
It may seem surprising that deficit financing (by either definition) 
was higher in the pre-Plan than the Plan period even though develop-
ment expenditure was much higher in the latter period. The explana-
tion can be found in the nature of budgetary resources available to 
the Government during this period. During the pre-Plan period, tax 
revenues were small (constituting only about 7.3 % of GNP), while the 
inflow of foreign aid and loans had not yet started on any consider-
able scale. The resort to deficit financing was inevitable, especially 
in the light of large and inflexible deftnce expenditures. In the Plan 
period, an effort was made to increase tax yields, though the increase 
was by no means adequate to balance government budgets. But for 
ithe receipt of substantial amounts of foreign aid and loans, the deve-
{opment expenditure would have been considerably lower (or deficit inancing considerably higher). 
P A R T I I 
RELATIONSHIP OF DEFICIT FINANCING TO MONEY SUPPLY 
1. Theoretical Credit-Creation Coefficient 
The impact of deficit financing on money supply depends on the 
credit-creation operations of the banking system and on the changes 
in foreign exchange reserves. On the assumption that lack of excess 
reserves and cash is the restraining factor on commercial banks' credit 
expansion, it is possible to calculate the credit-creation coefficient or 
multiplier9 of a one rupee increase in State Bank assets (i.e., of addi-
9. The "c r ed i t " referred to in the credit-creation coefficient is riot the same 
as the State Bank ' s concept of " b a n k credi t" . The State Bank includes only 
bills purchased and advances under t l i is t i t lewhereasthecredi t -creat ioncoeff ic ient 
refers to all non-currency-and-reserve assets held by the bank ing system. T h e 
difference is government and o ther securities. 
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tional deficit financing under the second definition not offset by 
reduction either of foreign exchange or of State Bank loans to the 
commercial banks . 1 0 
1 
c = 
1—d—e+rd 
where c = credit-creation coefficient (net addition to the money supply 
occasioned by a one rupee change in State Bank assets). 
d = ratio of demand deposits to money supply (at the margin). 
r = cash ratio (i.e., the proportion of demand deposits kept by 
banks in the form of State Bank deposits and currency, 
at the margin). 
e = the ratio of coinage in circulation to the money supply (at 
the margin). 
Simply, the formula states that the amount of credit created depends 
on how much of the newly created money comes back to the banks in 
the form of demand deposits and how much of it banks need to keep 
in currency and reserves, c will be large if d is large and r is low; c will 
be small if d is small and r is high. 
2. Numerical Estimate of c 
In Pakistan, demand deposits have remained almost unchanged 
during the 1950's at about one-third of total money supply. The 
legal reserve requirement is rather low: 5 per cent of demand deposits 
and 2 per cent of time deposits. The actual cash-plus-reserves ratio 
to demand deposits, however, has been much higher and has seldom 
fallen below 10 per cent. Taking d =.33, r = .13, and e =.05 ( c f . Ap-
pendix D) as likely values of these parameters during the 1950's, 
the credit-creation coefficient for Pakistan is 1.51; an increase in 
assets of the State Bank by one rupee would lead ultimately to an 
io. The assumptions underlying, and the derivations of, the formulas and 
data estimates in this Part are presented in Appendix D . A technical discussion 
of broad structures of banking systems and the general circumstances under 
which the analysis of this Part is relevant occurs in Appendix E. It is there 
shown that the credit-creation coefficient (derived in Appendix D and presented 
above) requires the assumption not only of no excess reserves but also that go-
vernment policy determines the State Bank holdings of government securities. 
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increase of .50 rupees in demand deposits and 1.01 of currency (held 
outside the banking system). If the legal reserve ratio were used in-
stead of the traditional one, the credit-creation coefficient would be 
slightly higher. Moreover, a complication in our analysis is intro-
duced by the fact that commercial banks in Pakistan are authorised to 
borrow from the State Bank on the collateral of their government 
securities which means that even if there are no excess reserves, the 
banking system can always expand credit by borrowing reserves. To 
the extent that the banks have excess reserves or are willing to borrow 
them, the potential credit-creation coefficient is higher than 1.51.11 
However, the general conclusion can be stated: the "probable" credit 
that the banking system will create (including lending to the govern-
ment) is about 51 rupees in response to a net addition of 100 rupees 
to the money supply by the government through deficit financing 
operations (under the second definition) which are not offset by 
declines in foreign exchange reserves (or other State Bank assets). 
The above discussion brings out three important points. First, 
the definition of deficit financing relevant to the problem of money 
supply expansion (under the assumptions made) is the second, the net 
addition to securities in the hands of the State Bank. Second, the 
impact of deficit financing (second definition) on the money supply 
may be "exported" through a reduction of foreign exchange reserves. 
For analysis of money expansion, the relevant multiplicand is the net 
sale of securities to the central bank (adjusted for change of govern-
ment deposits) less the decline in foreign exchange reserve.1 2 Third, 
the secondary implications of such primary injections of purchasing 
11. It will also be higher whenever the change of demand deposits becomes 
greater than 33 % of the change in money supply, change in time deposits greater 
than 4 0 % of the change in demand deposits, or banks are able to lower the rat io 
of cash-plus-reserves to demand deposits below 13%. 
12. Actually, the relevant multiplicand is the total change in State Bank 
1 
assets, i.e., M = — — ( F + G2 + A). The formulaabove assumesno change 
1—d—e + rd 
in A, assets other than government securities and foreign exchange. Implicitly, 
therefore, it is assumed that commercial bank borrowing f rom the State Bank 
(the most important of the "o the r " assets) either is independent of the amount 
of deficit financing or does not vary because of State Bank policy (or bank tradi-
tions). That other-than-seasonal changes in bank borrowing have not been 
important in the 1950's does not , of course, justify neglect of possible expansion 
in the 1960's. 
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power by the State are not likely to be very large in under-developed 
countries such as Pakistan. The banking system in these countries is 
geographically concentrated and banking habits incompletely develop-
ed, with the result that a large part of the additional purchasing power 
"leaks" out of the banking system in the form of currency in circula-
tion only a small proportion returning to form the basis of further 
credit creation. 
3. Comparison with Actual Values of c 
It is interesting to compare the theoretical credit-creation co-
efficient, calculated above, with the coefficient which emerges from 
empirical analysis. Columns (3) plus (5) of Table 1 give the total 
amount each year of deficit financing (second definition) which is not 
offset by a reduction of foreign exchange reserves, i.e., ( F + G 2 ) . 
This total is given in column (1) of Table 2 below. In column (2) 
below is the net credit creation by the commercial banks (i.e., lending 
to private and government sectors less time deposits), derived from 
Table 1 by adding columns (2) and (4) and subtracting column (3). 
The actual credit-creation coefficient, is, in Table 2, simply columns 
(1) plus (2) divided by column (1). 
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TABLE D-L 
Actual Credit Creation Coefficient in Pakistan 
(Million Rupees) 
Year 
Deficit financing 
(New unexported 
borrowing from 
State Bank) 
(1) 
Net credit-
creation by 
Commercial 
Banks 
(2) 
Credit-
creation 
coefficient 
(3) 
1951-52 —61 236 • 
1952-53 148 —55 .63 
1953-54 150 63 1.42 
1954-55 219 64 1.29 
Average Pre-Plan 114 77 1.68** 
1955-56 595 82 1.14 
1956-57 237 219 1.92 
1957-58 214 145 1.68 
1958-59 129 139 2.08 
1959-60 111 229 3.06 
Average Plan: 257 163 1.63** 
"Negative. 
••These coefficients are derived from the average level of columns (1) and (2); 
they are not averages of the ratios for these years. 
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Leaving aside annual fluctuations, the conclusion emerges clearly 
from the above table that the credit-creation coefficient was much 
the same in the Plan period as in the pre-Plan period. In each period, 
borrowing of 100 rupees by the Government f rom the State Bank 
resulted in additional credit creation of about 66 rupees by the bank-
ing system. In each period, the coefficient is distinctly higher than the 
"probable" coefficient earlier computed, 1.51. This results almost 
entirely from the banking system's gradual lowering of its cash-plus-
reserve ratio over the entire period. Another significant point is 
that the banking system has been able to increase the volume of its 
credit in recent years despite the fact that the Government has not been 
permitting the assets of the State Bank to expand as rapidly as earlier 
in an effort to exert a contractionary influence on the economy. This 
has been possible primarily because of a much-reduced "cash dra in" 
over the last two years (the marginal value of d for 1958-60 was .62, 
almost twice its usual value over the decade). 
4. Time Deposits 
So far the role of time deposits has been ignored. The credit-
creation coefficient has been calculated taking into account only 
demand deposits and, similarly, the actual credit-creation by the 
banking system was in net terms, after subtracting the accumulation 
(or adding the decumulation) of time deposits. This was done in 
accordance with the usual concept of money supply m T s f e i s t a n 1 3 
which excludes time "depositsTIt can be argued that the accumulation 
of time deposits in the banking system is a sufficiently important facet 
of growing liquidity to have been integrated into the analysis. An 
attempt to do this is made below. 
If the definition of the money supply is altered to include time 
deposits, the credit-creation coefficient will also become: 
1 + td 
c' 
1—d—e+rd 
where: c' = credit-creation coefficient when time deposits are included 
in money supply. 
i I n Pakistan money supply also excludes per contra liabilities (amounting 
to over Rs. 900 million at present) which are in the nature of short-term credit. 
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t = time deposits as a fraction of demand deposits (at the 
margin). 
d = t h e ratio of demand deposits to demand deposits plus 
currency in circulation (at the margin). 
r and e are as defined earlier. 
This formula for c' also derived in Appendix D, is subject to all the 
same caveats and restrictions as were offered with the formula for c. 
Taking t = .40 one calculates c' =1.71. Thus, an increase of State Bank 
assets by one rupee would lead ultimately to a rise of currency in 
circulation by 1.01 rupees, demand deposits by .50 rupees, and time 
deposits by .20 rupees. 
Table 2 may now be repeated under this alternative definition of 
money supply. Column 1 of Table 3 below is the same as column 1 
of Table 2. Column 2, however, is now gross rather than net credit-
creation by commercial banks (i.e., changes in time deposits are not 
deducted in Table 3). The actual credit-creation coefficients are com-
puted in column 3. 
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TABLE D-L 
Actual Credit-Creation Coefficient in Pakistan 
(with Time Deposits included in Money Supply) 
(Million Rupees) 
Year 
Deficit Financing 
(New unexported 
borrowing from 
State Bank) 
(1) 
Gross credit-
creation by 
Commercial 
Banks 
(2) 
Credit-
creation 
coefficient 
(3) 
1951-52 —61 202 * 
1952-53 148 5 1.03 
1953-54 150 192 2.28 
1954-55 219 150 1.68 
Average pre-Plan: 114 137 2.20 
1955-56 595 126 1.21 
1956-57 237 224 1.94 
1957-58 214 276 2.29 
1958-59 129 192 2.49 
1959-60 111 422 4.80 
Average Plan: 257 248 1.96 
'Negative 
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Here also, the actual credit-creation coefficients far exceed the "prob-
able". This occurs for the same reasons that actual exceeded 
"probable" c, plus the additional one that t rose secularly throughout 
the decade. It would seem that actual c' (and also c, to a lesser extent) 
declined from the pre-Plan to the Plan period. Actually, it would 
have risen slightly were it not for a significant increase of the State 
Bank's "other assets" ("o ther" than foreign exchange and government 
debt) during 1951-55—commercial banks increased their State Bank 
borrowing by more during 1951-55 than during 1955-60. While the 
actual credit-creation coefficients have probably not declined over 
1951-60, there is reason for suspecting that they may now begin to do 
so. Time deposits will probably not continue to rise so dramatically 
(relative to demand deposits) and the room for further economization 
of the banks' cash-plus-reserves ratio is small; unless the "cash dra in" 
declines (i.e., d rises), the credit-creation coefficients must fall. The 
importance of this lies in the computation of safe limits of deficit 
financing in the future. 
5. Private vs. Government Credit 
To further understanding of the causes of the expansion of 
money, bank credit can be sub-divided into: (1) credit to the private 
sector (gross; i.e., without subtraction of time deposit increases) and 
(2) credit to the government sector, and then studied alongside State 
Bank asset expansion. This is set out in Table 4 below: 
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TABLE D-L 
Relationship of Deficit Financing and Bank Credit 
(Mill ion Rupees) 
Year 
Deficit 
Financing (new 
unexported 
borrowing from 
State Bank) 
Bank Credit 
Private 
Sector 
Government 
Sector 
(1) (2) (3) 
1951-52 
1952-53 
1953-54 
1954-55 
—61 
148 
150 
219 
230 
—124 
133 
96 
—28 
130 
59 
55 
Average pre-Plan 114 76 54 
1955-56 
1956-57 
1957-58 
1958-59 
1959-60 
595 
237 
214 
129 
111 
31 
237 
42 
—4 
358 
95 
—13 
235 
196 
64 
Average Plan: 257 133 115 
It is clear from the above table that bank loans to the private 
sector have not played a very consistent role in increasing (or decreas-
ing) the volume of credit. Bank credit to the private sector was at 
least as large as the new, unexported government borrowing from the 
State Bank in three years, 1951-52, 1956-57 and 1959-60, and in all 
three years it reflected the influence of increased trade activity. In 
1951-52, the commercial sector was flourishing as a result of the 
Korean boom, exports reached an all-time high, making possible the 
introduction of Open General Licence and extremely liberal imports. 
In 1956-57, trade activity picked up again in the wake of devaluation 
of Pakistani rupee. Out of 237 million rupees of new credit advanced 
to the private sector that year, commerce claimed over 160 million 
rupees, or nearly 70 per cent. In two years private sector credit has 
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actually contracted. In 1952-53 the considerable decline in private 
credit reflected the recessionary tendencies that followed the Korean 
boom, resulting in a retirement of bank credit advanced in the preced-
ing year. 
It appears that the state of commercial activity, rather than deficit 
financing operations of the Government, has been the relevant factor 
in expansion of bank credit to the private sector. This is natural . 
Whereas deficit financing by the Government could increase the poten-
tial of the banking system to create additional credit (by adding to their 
reserves), it could hardly create a demand for bank credit by the private 
sector, except indirectly as government activity gradually induced the 
growth of commerce and private industry. It would be correct t0} 
say, therefore, that the demand for credit determined the expansion of 
bank credit to the private sector throughout the period, even when deficit 
financing operations of the Government enabled the banks greatly to 
increase total credit. This may seem surprising in view of the exist-
ence of considerable unsatisfied demand for bank credit for long-
term investment in industry, agriculture and construction. The 
explanation lies in the nature of the banking system in Pakistan. The 
banks have been more willing to lend to commerce (against the security 
of merchandise) than to make long-term investments which involve 
greater risks. Though bank lending to industry has assumed more 
importance recently, most of the long-term investments in industry, 
agriculture and commerce have come from government-financed cor-
porations (e.g., PIFCO, PICIC, ADFC, HBFC) and not f rom the 
banking system. 
6. Dangers of Latent Liquidity 
It can be seen f rom Table 4 that commercial banks have increas-
ingly become suppliers of credit to the Government. This is a signi-
ficant development. The explanation lies mainly in government 
policy. In the pre-Plan period, the Government resorted mainly to 
State Bank for its borrowings: the average annual borrowing from 
the banking system was 372 million rupees during this period, of which 
318 million rupees (or 85 per cent) were from the State Bank. During 
the Plan period, the position changed considerably: out of an average 
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annual borrowing of 331 million rupees, the State Bank contributed 
216 million rupees (or 65 per cent). It appears that the Government 
has increasingly turned to the commercial banks for its borrowing. 
This may be partly the result of a growing belief that excess reserves 
in the banking system should be withdrawn through sales of govern-
ment securities in order to reduce the dangers inherent in large 
amounts of latent liquidity. In any case, the fact remains that the 
government has been borrowing from the banking system a large 
part of the very liquidity that it itself has been creating. 
It is interesting to speculate how the banks would have behaved 
if the Government had not borrowed considerable sums from them 
to meet its financial needs. It is obvious that the Government would 
have resorted more to the State Bank, given the same financial needs, 
thereby creating an even greater amount of reserves for the commer-
cial banks. It is possible that the banks would have hoarded this 
liquidity in the absence of any worthwhile risks against which they 
could lend. The fact that the banks have been lending to the Gov-
ernment at 3 per cent (4 per cent since late 1958), despite unsatisfied 
demand for private credit at higher interest rates, lends support to 
this hypothesis. If the hypothesis is correct, it can be argued that 
the Government borrowed from the banks at a certain cost what it 
could alternatively have borrowed from the State Bank at zero 
cost. Such a view, however, would be short-sighted. Even if the 
commercial banks were willing to hoard liquidity for lack of " sound" 
alternative investments, it would hardly have been wise to over-burden 
them with liquidity in the hope that bank hoards would continue to 
grow. The situation would have become explosive: (1) whenever the 
tempo of economic activity rose, offering worthwhile investment 
opportunities to the banks, or (2) if the banks had lowered their stan-
dards concerning risk as their liquidity improved. The Government 
policy of regularly withdrawing liquidity from the banking system 
was, therefore, a sound one. A close look at Table 4 will show that 
the Government entered the money market mainly in dull periods 
when bank lending to the private sector was rather small. 
But the problem still remains. The commercial banks have 
acquired nearly Rs. 700 million of government paper since 
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This they can treat as their secondary reserves—and they can always 
borrow on their government paper at the prevailing bank rate of 4 per 
cent to augment their cash and reserves. This means that if economic 
growth accelerates and the private sector approaches the banking 
system with worthwhile projects, potentialities for credit expansion 
are great even if the Government abstains from further expansion of 
State Bank assets. Recent trends confirm this view: commercialj tanks 
have expanded their credit tremendously in 1950-60 despite the anti-
deficit-financing attitude taken by the Government. This has import-
ant implications for State Bank policy regarding future course of 
deficit financing. 
7. Foreign Exchange Balances 
In all our discussion of actual and potential credit-creation co-
efficients, we have carefully considered the net^.hangp in State Bank 
assets as the driving factor in money creation. Thus we have been 
as much considering the effect of balance of payments surpluses (or 
deficits) as we have the net increase (or decrease) of government secu-
rities in the State Bank's portfolio. Nevertheless, the two influences 
have remained so aloof f rom each other that we would hardly know 
they were related; perhaps this is because they are also uncertain of 
the exact nature of their relationship. Basically, there is the question 
whether changes in the foreign sector during the 1950's reflected the 
effect of doses of deficit financing or whether the foreign sector was 
merely made to adjust to government policy through exchange controls 
without regard to the domestic monetary situation.1 4 Tentatively, it 
can be said that, in the pre-Plan period, running_downjof foreign 
balances was a deliberate government policy in order to utilise accu-
mulated sterling balances. Deficit financing operations of the Gov-
ernment were, therefore, in line with this policy as these kept restoring 
the liquidity which was being withdrawn through the reduction of 
foreign exchange reserves. In the Plan period building up of foreign 
exchange reserves was regarded almost as a necessity by the Govern-
ment, after earlier depletions, and this was undertaken irrespective of 
the domestic monetary situation. 
14. The question requires detailed analysis and is expected to be the 
subject of a later monoaraph . 
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PART III 
SAFE LIMITS OF MONETARY EXPANSION 
1. The Cash-Balance Equation 
In a growing economy, additional liquidity of all kinds is generally 
required to match the increasing supplies of goods and services. 
Additional demand for money in particular will also arise if the eco-
nomy is becoming increasingly monetised or if demand for cash 
hoards increases. Up to a point, therefore, growth of the money 
supply need not be inflationary. The purpose of this section is to 
discuss whether it is possible to determine "safe", non-inflationary 
limits of monetary expansion.15 In order to find these "safe" limits, 
the monetary requirements of the economy must be determined. 
Consider a time period when money supply bears a certain rela-
tionship to national income. Call this ratio average k. The future 
money needs of the economy depend on how marginal k (i.e., change 
of monetary requirements per unit of additional output) is likely 
to behave. Insofar as the structural changes that Pakistan is likely 
to undergo keep marginal k above average k, an important leeway 
exists for financing capital formation through injections of new money. 
So long as these injections are timed exactly to meet the demand for 
additional money being created by various structural changes in the 
economy, there need be no inflation. 
This point can be expressed more formally. Consider the Cam-
bridge cash-balance equation: 
M = k p X 
The derivative of the logarithm of this equation gives the following 
approximation (for small values of A): 
15. The analysis in this section is based primarily on a discussion of this 
problem in Dr . Mahbubu l -Haq s thesis on Planned Capital Formation in Under-
developed Countries: The Case of Pakistan, Yale, 1957. pp. 23-37. 
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A p A M A X A k 
P M X k 
where: k = Monetary requirements per unit of output ; 
p = Price level; 
X --= Output (national income in constant prices); 
M = Money supply; 
A = Change bfetween two periods of time. 
If k does not change (i.e. A k / k =0), the demand for money will in-
crease proportionately with the change in output (if the price level is 
to be kept constant, (i.e., A p / p = 0 ) . However, if A k / k is positive 
(as it will be if marginal k is greater than average k), the price level 
may be kept constant even when the percentage increase in the money 
supply exceeds the percentage increase of output. In fact, the price 
level will remain stable as long as: 
A M A X A k 
Thus, the marginal changes of k and X determine the safe limits to the 
growth of the money supply. 
2. Secular Change in k 
The most important structural changes tending to increase k 
would be: (1) a decrease in the income-velocity of that money held for 
transactions purposes, (2) net additions to hoards in excess of the 
rate of increase of output, and (3) the relative importance of the 
monetized and non-monetized sectors. 
Any decrease in income velocity of transactions money implies 
a fall of prices if the money supply is not increased. The income-
velocity of transactions depends mainly on income-expenditure and 
income-payment periods and the extent of their over-lapping. The 
income-expenditure period will tend to lengthen as there is a shift in 
emphasis from small to large shopping units, from basic necessities to 
consumer durables, f rom cash payments to cheque payments, and 
from immediate consumption to more distant consumption (i.e. 
1" 
M X k 
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saving). The income-payment period will tend to lengthen with 
substitution of weekly wages for daily wages and multiplication of the 
number of productive stages (resulting from introduction of more 
roundabout production techniques). The extension of these two 
periods would increase the monetary requirements'® by increasing 
the length of time required by an average consumer-producer circuit. 
As to the degree of over-lapping, it is "perfect" when the longest 
payment-period encompasses all the income-expenditure periods, so 
that the monetary requirement reaches its minimum. Since both the 
periods are likely to increase simultaneously in Pakistan, it is difficult 
to estimate whether, or by how much, monetary requirements would 
increase or decrease through a corresponding fall or rise in the "degree 
of perfection" of over-lapping. However, it emerges clearly that the 
structural changes in Pakistan at present are more likely to decrease, 
rather than increase, the income-velocity of circulation of transactions 
money. 
A net increase in hoards at a rate faster than the rise of national 
income will tend to increase k. Public borrowings from the banking 
s ystem are usually defended as a sound economic policy on the grounds 
tha t a substantial part of internal savings takes the form of hoards 
and, therefore, government merely "activates" this traditional and 
unproductive mode of saving into socially desirable investments. 
The government borrows at zero cost (if the central bank is the lender) 
or at the current rate of interest (if the commercial banks are the 
lenders) and, by adding to the real capital stock of the community, it 
helps the economy to save in real terms (new capital stock) what 
certain members of it have chosen to save in money terms (new liquid 
hoards). This is a valid contention but it should also be realized 
that investments financed by such borrowings create a "double claim" 
on the goods produced, by creating new money without withdrawing 
the old from the owners of hoards.1 7 The increment to hoards does 
not, therefore, create a leeway for monetary expansion in the 
same way as the other structural changes mentioned above since it is 
16. Other factors (such as the financial integration of the economic system 
and improvements in means of t ransport and communication) operate to eco-
nomize somewhat on the need for holding cash per unit of output . 
17. Furthermore, if hoards are in gold or foreign exchange reserves and not 
in local currency, the question of offsetting is made more complex. 
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easily reversible. It is difficult to say whether money hoards will 
have a secular tendency to grow more or less than proportionately 
to national income. If hoards do increase significantly, it will pro-
bably be due to short-run developments, such as the recent shortage of 
foreign exchange which forces potential investment funds of indus-
trialists into idle hoards. 
The relative importance of the monetized and non-monetized 
sectors will depend both (a) on the rate at which previously non-
monetized sector becomes monetized and (b) on the relative rates of 
growth of the two sectors. The existing non-monetized sector will 
become monetized rather slowly as commercialization of agriculture 
takes place, as market incentives (such as the recent decontrol of food-
grains) bring forth (hopefully) increased marketable surplus, and as 
economic forces generally creep into the rural economy of Pakistan. 
However, it is quite likely that the existing monetized sector will grow 
at a rate higher than national income because it includes the dynamic 
sector of industry, where growth is relatively rapid, whereas the agri-
cultural sector (which is larger non-monetized) has generally a slower 
rate of growth. A rough estimate of the rate of growth of the mone-
tized sector has been prepared in Appendix F. Probably, the non-
monetized sector declined from 25 per cent of national income in 
1951-52to about20 percent by 1958-59 but no significant monetization 
of the non-monetized sector occurred during the decade. It is likely 
that this trend will continue since the rate of growth in the present 
monetized sector is expected to be much higher than the rate of 
growth in the existing non-monetized sector. 
3. The Rise in k during the 1950's 
The implication of the above discussion is that marginal k is 
likely to be higher than average k, indicating a greater leeway for 
monetary expansion than may appear f rom the increase in output 
alone. Empirically also, there is evidence that k has been rising during 
the 1950's. Between the year 1951-52 (July-June) and 1959-60, 
the money supply increased by 76 per cent and output (national in-
come in constant prices) by 21 per cent. Thus, the sum of the per-
centage change in prices and the percentage change in k (over this 
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same period) must be 55 per cent. The assumption that k has not 
changed implies that the entirety of this 55 per cent rise is in prices, 
or. in other words, that prices have risen about 5.7 per cent per annum 
since 1951-52. No price index suggests even the possibility of such 
a high degree of inflation; the conclusion must be that k has risen 
substantially, over the past ten years. 
The Institute of Development Economics price index (to be 
published shortly) indicates that the percentage price rise for the 
period from July 1951-June 1952 to July 1959-June 1960 has been 
about 20 per cent 1 8 . 
With the help of this figure, an estimate of the change in k can be 
made: 
Ak A M AX A p 
k M X p 
= .76— .21—.20 
= .35 
Thus, the figures suggest that k has risen 35 per cent over the past 
eight years, or 3.9 per cent per annum. This tends to substantiate the 
1 8 . Other indices do not yield very different results. The table below gives 
the percentage rise of various price indices over this period: 
Average Value Average Value Percentage 
Index July 1951- July 1959- rise 
June 1952 June 1960 
(1) (2) (3) 
Consumers Price Index for 
Govt . & Commercial Employees 
(Karachi) 94 112 19 
Cost of Living, Industrial Workers 
—Karachi 100 125 25 
—Lahore 93 111 19 
—Sialkot 83 108 30 
—Khewra 64 109 16 
—Narayangan j 105 123 17 
Institute of Development Econo-
mics Index 100 120 20 
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hypothesis that k can be expected to rise as an underdeveloped eco-
nomy grows. Of course, it is possible that k increased for quite 
different reasons and even possible that its rise was a completely 
artificial concomitant of government suppression of greater inflation. 
It is also possible that the rise in k was no more than a temporary 
phenomenon of the 1950s—and indeed, of the early 1950s. The data 
for 1955-60 indicate that k fell by almost 4 per cent per annum (after 
rising about 10 per cent per annum over 1950-55). 
If it can be assumed that a 4 per cent per annum rise of k is 
natural and will continue, then there is scope for non-inflationary 
increases in the money supply. If it is also assumed that output ( G N P 
at constant prices) will increase by 4 per cent per annum (as in the 
Second Five Year Plan, p. 45), the money supply may increase by 
8 per cent per annum before it begins to cause a rise in the general 
price level. 
If, however, the 4 per cent per annum decline in k, over 1955-60, 
is extrapolated (and a 4 per cent rise in output is assumed) any 
increase in the money supply will be inflationary. 
4. Safe Increase in Money during 1960-65 
The maximum non-inflationary increase in the money supply 
over 1960-65, called AM*, may be written as a fraction, m, of the 
June 1960 money supply, M. Then, 
where (Ak/k)e and(AX/X) e are the estimated (or expected) percentage 
increases in k and output during 1960-65. This parameter, m, is 
almost certainly not negative—it is difficult to conceive of a decline 
in k sufficient to more than offset the rise in national ou tpu t—but 
estimates of the size of m may vary greatly. If output grew only 15 
per cent over 1960-65 (i.e., at three-quarters the 20 per cent rate pro-
jected by the Plan) and k fell equally, m would be as low as zero. On 
the other hand, acceptance of the Plan's output projections and simple 
extrapolation of the rise in k over the past eight years (3.9 per cent 
per annum, or 21 per cent for 1960-65) yields what is probably a ceiling 
m 
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value for m, .41. This difference is not unimportant; the safe increase 
in money supply over 1960-65 (AM*) is nil if m is zero but is 2400 
million rupees if m is .41. 
In the Second Five Year Plan, m is placed at .25—"an increase 
of around 25 per cent in the money supply can, therefore, be regarded 
as tolerable over the Plan per iod" (page 62). The Planning Com-
mission arrives at this estimate of m from its projection of a 20 per 
cent increase in output and its prediction of a 5 per cent rise in k 
(i.e., about 1 per cent per annum). 
P A R T I V 
CONCLUSION : SAFE LIMITS TO DEFICIT FINANCING 
1. Stability of the Relationships 
From the analysis of the first three Parts, the basic conclusion 
may be drawn that useful (i.e., stable) long-run behavioral relation-
ships either can or cannot be found between the fundamental mone-
tary variables, i.e., deficit financing, money supply and the price level. 
It is wise to look first at the negative position. 
The money supply in any economy is determined by many factors. 
To single out deficit financing, by either definition, even after adjust-
ment for compensatory variation in foreign exchange balances, is to 
neglect many other important ingredients of money-supply determina-
tion. Such factors as the public's demand for currency, time deposits 
or bank loans, and the banking system's desire for reserves or liquidity, 
are capable of fluctuation, and have in fact varied, sometimes greatly, 
over the past decade.1 9 To the extent that these factors change, 
the relationship between deficit financing, however defined, and the 
money supply becomes tenuous. A mere glance at Table 1 offers sup-
port to this position. 
'9 . Some of this fluctuation may be observed in Appendix D , where the 
marginal ra t ios of different sub-periods of the 1950's a re computed for : (1) t ime 
deposits to demand deposits, (2) demand deposits to money supply, (3) cash-plus-
reserves of banks to demand deposits, and (4) coinage in circulat ion to money 
supply. 
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If the relationship between deficit financing and changes in money 
supply is tenuous, even more so is that between changes in the money 
supply and changes in the price level. For example, the price level 
fell, certainly in 1954-55 and probably in 1953-54, despite a rise in 
money supply of 7-8 per cent in each of these years. At the other 
extreme, prices rose by at least 10 per cent in 1958-59 (probably the 
second largest annual rise in the 1950s, after 1955-56) despite the very 
small increase in money of 4 per cent. Even if the excess of money 
supply changes over output changes is considered, the fluctuations in 
income velocity over the past decade forestall a close relationship 
between money and prices. 
Thus the conclusion that the chain of relations from deficit 
financing to price levels is too loose to have short-run predictive value 
is plausible. But such a conclusion should not discourage economists 
anxious to weight the probable influence on prices of the 1,000 million 
rupee deficit financing (first definition, i.e., new debt to be held by the 
banking system) of the Second Five Year Plan. For it neglects the 
salient fact that the changes in those other factors that affect price 
levels are not completely unpredictable, especially if periods longer 
than a year are considered. Much of the fluctuation actually dis-
appears if periods of four or five years are taken; it is no accident, 
for example, that the credit-creation coefficients of Table 2 and 3, 
despite their great year-to-year fluctuations, show little change from 
the pre-Plan period, 1951-55, to the Plan period, 1955-60. 
It is therefore appropriate to compute "safe" (i.e., non-infla-
tionary) limits to deficit financing over a longer period (e.g., that of 
the Second Five Year Plan, 1960-65) even though such calculation is 
liable to serious short-run error. 
In order to make the analysis comparable to that of the Plan, 
certain assumptions of the Planning Commission are accepted here: 
(1) the foreign exchange balance will not change over the period, and 
(2) the "other items" of the money supply will not change . 2 0 
20. For the composit ion of "o ther i tems" see page 6 and Appendix B. 
It is also assumed that "o the r deposits" of the State Bank do not change; this 
assumption, though not made (explicitly) in the Plan, does not affect the results. 
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2. Prediction from the "Causative" Analysis 
In Part I, the "causative", or balancing, analysis made use of the 
identity, 
A M = A G , + A L — A T 
where A refers to the change over a period of time, M is money 
supply (exclusive of time deposits), A G I is deficit financing (first 
definition), L is private advances, and T is time deposits. Under 
certain circumstances, this accounting relation may be used to deter-
mine the safe limits to deficit financing ( A G ! * ; the asterisk is used 
throughout this section to refer to the non-inflationary limit of a 
variable) during the Second Plan. As a first step, the above equation 
may be re-written: 
A G * , = A M * — A L + A T 
= m M — A L + A T 
where m is A M * / M , as defined in Part III (p. 29). If, as a sufficient 
condition, A L and A T can be estimated exogenously, the right-side 
of the equation can be used to provide an estimate of the safe limit 
to deficit financing (first definition). Assuming that this can be done 
and, for simplicitly, that A L = A L ° and A T = A T ° , the safe limit 
to deficit financing (first definition) is: 
A G X * = mM— A L ° + A T ° 
This procedure is legitimate for an economy where the commercial 
banks themselves determine the size of their reserves (by purchase 
from, or sale to., the State Bank of government securities)21, as is 
now the case in Pakistan. It is the technique of analysis of safe 
limits used by the Second Five Year Plan. The above formula is 
applied, with the following estimates of the right-side parameter and 
variables:2 2 
21. c f . Appendix E. 
22. Second Five Year Plan, pp. 62-63. The Plan, published in June, 1960. 
used the provisional March 1960 money supply figure. If the correct June 1960 
figure is used (M of 5856 million rupees'), A G* i is 1064 million rupees. The error 
is negligible. 
m =-.25 
M =5900 million rupees 
A L ° = 7 0 0 million rupees 
A T ° = 3 0 0 million rupees 
The safe limit to deficit financing ( A G I * ) is then computed at 1075 
million rupees. This safe limit would be higher, the higher the esti-
mate of m and A T ° and the lower the estimate of AL°. If the true 
values of m, A L ° and A T ° are within 20 per cent of the estimates 
given above, then the estimate of safe limits to deficit financing is 
accurate only within 50 per cent (i.e., the true safe limit is between 
500 and 1500 million rupees). 
3. Prediction from Credit-Creation Coefficients 
In the analysis of Part II, howevet, the amount of new loans 
made by banks is not considered exogenous but is dependent upon 
the amount of reserves made available by government policy to the 
banking system. Under those circumstances, the basic relationship 
was found to be: 
1 
A M = A G 2 
1—d+rd 
where A G 2 is deficit financing by the second definition, d is the mar-
ginal ratio of demand deposits to money supply, and r is the marginal 
ratio of cash-plus-reserves of banks to their demand deposits. 2 3 This 
formula has predictive value only if A G 2 is a policy variable (i.e., 
exogenous)2 4 ; if it is, the equation can be used also to define the 
safe limit to deficit financing (by the second definition): 
A G * 2 = ( 1 — d + r d ) A m M * 
=(1—d+rd ) inM 
If m, d and r (and implicitly t, the marginal ratio of time to demand 
deposits) are known or can be estimated, t h e n A G * 2 can be com-
2 3. See p. 11 ff and Appendix D for derivation and discussion of this equa-
tion. For consistency with the earlier assumption that A J (change in coinage 
in circulation) is zerio, e (the marginal ratio of coinage to money, i.e., A J / A M ) 
is also assumed to be zero. 
24. Cf. Appendix E for further discussion of this. 
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puted. If m = .25, d = .33 and r = .13 (with M =5856 million rupees), 
A G * 2 for 1960-65 is 1040 million rupees. If the true values of 
m, d and r are within 20% of these estimates then the above estimate 
of the safe limit of deficit financing is accurate to within 30 per cent 
{i.e., the true value of A G * 2 is between 750 and 1350 million rupees).2 5 
4. Implications for Public Policy 
It should be noted that the estimates of the safe limits to deficit 
financing by the first definition and by the second are nearly identical 
(1064 million rupees versus 1040 million rupees). This implies that 
the deficit financing (first definition) projected under the Second 
Five Year Plan, 1000 million rupees, will not be inflationary even if 
all this new debt is purchased by the State Bank (provided the predic-
tion of a 1 per cent per annum rise in k over 1960-65 is realistic). 
Furthermore, if government policy were to insure that no more 
than 1040 million rupees ( A G * 2 ) of new debt were sold to the State 
Bank, then the total new debt ( A G * J ) could be greatly increased 
without incurring inflationary pressure. But this condition—that the 
commercial banks be induced to hold that new debt in excess of 1040 
million rupees—implies a willingness to destabilise interest rates on 
government securities. If a neutral or passive, monetary policy is to 
be followed, then the government has little control over the placement 
of the new debt and the total of new debt cannot safely exceed 1046 
million rupees ( A G * 1). 
Thus, there are two possible links in Pakistan between deficit 
financing and money supply depending upon the monetary policy 
assumed. These links, coupled with a knowledge of the safe limit 
to money expansion, permit estimates of the safe limit to deficit 
financing. Use of this chain of relationships to predict the safe limit 
over 1960-65 indicates, reassuringly, that the Second Five Year Plan 
has not been incautious, with respect to inflationary pressures, in its 
deficit financing plans, provided k rises as anticipated. If it rises by 
less than 1 per cent per annum (or falls), the government will be faced 
by unpleasant choices. 
25. o f course, this greater accuracy of estimation of A G * 2 , relative to 
that of A G * I , for given parameter error, is not evidence that the A G * 2 approach 
to estimation of safe limits is in any way more accurate or better. 
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APPENDICES 
A P P E N D I X A 
TABLE 1 
Money Supply and its Causative Factors 
(1951-52 to 1959-60) 
Summary Position (Rs. in Million) 
C A U S A T I V E F A C T O R S 1951-52 1952-53 1953-54 1954-55 1955-56 1956-57 1957-58 1958-59 1959-60 
A . PRIVATE S E C T O R : 
1. B a n k s ' l o a n s to Private Sector 229.8 —124.4 133.2 95.2 + 31.5 240.2 29.0 —6.3 357.3 
2. Banks ' investment in Private N.A. N .A . N .A . 0.5 —0.5 —3.2 12.5 2.1 0.2 
Securities. 
3. Increase (—) or decrease ( + ) 34.5 —61.0 —129.3 —86.3 —44.4 —4.8 —131.6 —53-2 —192.6 
of t ime deposits. 
4 . N e t position of the Private 264.3 —185.4 3.9 9.4 —13.4 232.2 —90.1 —57.4 164.9 
Sector. 
B. G O V E R N M E N T S E C T O R : 
1. Banks ' investment in Govern- —28.0 129.6 58.5 54.7 94.6 9.8 170.7 112.7 106.1 
ment Securities. 
2. Banks ' loans to Government . N .A . N .A . N .A . N .A . N .A . —23.1 63.8 82.8 —41.9 
3. S.B.P. holding of Government 54.6 358.0 38.4 147.0 456.3 772.0 567.4 19.5 —59.6 
Securities. 
4. S.B.P. loans to Government . . . —1.7 100.8 —27.8 —r21.3 —53.5 110.3 —23.8 —14.3 
5. Accumulation (—) or decumu-
lation ( + ) of cash balances 
Central 333.5 70.5 199.0 64.9 —143.2 —372.3 —194.3 —12.1 —13.0 
Provincial 19.3 —3.8 —21.0 —37.0 —18.1 31.7 50.6 —16.8 10.4 
6. N e t posit ion of the Govern- 377.7 655.1 247.1 208.3 336.1 418.1 768.5 162.3 —12.3 
ment Sector. 
C . F O R E I G N S E C T O R : —467.4 —376.9 —38.3 65.9 353.5 —194.0 —320.0 162.7 188.3 
D . O T H E R I T E M S : . . . —20.9 —36.1 49.7 —20.8 —22.8 —2.3 —7.0 —69.7 —44.9 
M O N E Y S U P P L Y 153.7 56.7 262.4 262.8 653.4 454.0 351.4 197.9 296.0 
T A B L E 3 
Money Supply anil its Causative Factors 
1 9 5 2 - 5 3 
(Rs. in Million) 
Causative Factors June 
1951 
June 
1952 
Direction 
of 
Change 
Net 
change 
in each 
sector 
A. Private Sector: 
1. Banks' loans to private sector 550.3 780.1 + 229.8 
2. Banks' investment in private 
securities N.A. N.A. N .A. 
3. Time Deposits: 
increase(—) decrease( + ) ... 277.3 242.8 + 34.5 
4. Net position of the private 
sector 273.0 537.3 264.3 
B. Government Sector: 
1. Banks' investment in govern-
ment securities 616.3 588.3 —28.0 
2. Bank's loans to government N.A. N.A. N.A. 
3 S.B.P. holding of government 
securities 1554.9 1609.5 + 54.6 
4. S.B.P. loans to government 3.5 1.8 —1.7 
5. Accumulation (—) or 
decumulation ( + ) of 
cash balances 
Central Government 775.2 441.7 + 333.5 
Provincial Government 21.7 2.4 +19.3 
6. Net position of the govern-
ment sector 1377.8 1755.5 + 377.7 
C. Foreign Sector: 1513.1 1045.7 —467.4 
D. Other Items: 3.6 —17.3 —20.9 
M O N E Y SUPPLY 3167.5 3321.2 + 153.7 
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T A B L E 3 
Money Supply anil its Causative Factors 
1 9 5 2 - 5 3 
(Rs. in Million) 
Causative Factors June 
1952 
June 
1953 
Direction 
of 
Change 
Net 
change 
in each 
sector 
A. Private Sector: 
1. Banks' loans to private sector 780.1 655.7 —124.4 
2. Banks' investment in private 
securities. 
N.A. N .A. N .A. 
3. Time Deposits: increase(—) 
decrease( + ) 242.8 303.8 —61.0 
4. Net position of the private 
sector 537.3 351.9 —185.4 
B. Government Sector: 
1. Banks' investment in govern-
ment securities 588.3 717.9 + 129.6 
2. Banks' loans to government N.A. N.A. N .A. 
3. S.B.P. holding of govern-
ment securities 1609.5 1967.5 + 358.0 
4. S.B.P. loans to government 1.8 102.6 + 100.8 
5. Accumulation (—) or 
decumulation ( + ) of 
cash balances 
Central Government 441.7 371.2 70.5 
Provincial Government 2.4 6.2 —3.8 
6. Net position of the govern-
ment sector 1759.5 2410.6 + 655.1 
C. Foreign Sector: 1045.7 668.8 —376.9 
D. Other Items: —17.3 —53.4 —36.1 
M O N E Y SUPPLY 3321.2 3377.9 + 56.7 
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TABLE 3 
Money Supply anil its Causative Factors 
1 9 5 2 - 5 3 
(Rs. in Million) 
Causative Factors June 
1953 
June 
1954 
Direction 
of 
Change 
Net 
change 
in each 
sector 
A. Private Sector: 
1. Banks' loans to private sector 655.7 788.9 + 133.2 
2. Banks' investment in private 
securities N.A. N .A. 1 N.A. 
3. Time Deposits: increase (—) 
decrease ( + ) 303.8 433.1 —129.3 
4. Net position of the private 
sector 351.9 355.8 + 3.9 
B. Government Sector: 
1. Banks' investment in govern-
ment securities 717.9 776.4 + 58.5 
2. Banks' loans to government N.A. N.A. N.A. 
3. S.B.P.holding of government 
securities 1967.5 2005.9 + 38.4 
4. S.B.P. loans to government 102.6 74.8 —27.8 
5. Accumulation (—) or 
decumulation ( + ) 
of cash balances 
Central Government ... 371.2 172.2 + 199.0 
Provincial Government 6.2 27.2 —21.0 
6. Net position of the govern-
ment sector 2410.6 2657.7 + 247.1 
C. Foreign Sector: 668.8 630.5 —38.3 
D . Other Items: —53.4 —3.7 + 49.7 
MONEY SUPPLY 3377.9 3640.3 + 262.4 
'The figure for June 1954 is available but since the corresponding figure for 
June 1953 is not available this figure has not been included in column for June 
1954 to find out net position of the private sector. 
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T A B L E 3 
Money Supply anil its Causative Factors 
1 9 5 2 - 5 3 
(Rs. in Million) 
Causative Factors June 
1954 
June 
1955 
Direction 
of 
Change 
Net 
change 
in each 
sector 
A. Private Sector: 
1. Banks' loans to private sector 788.9 884.1 + 95.2 
2. Banks' investment in private 
securities 19.9 20.4 +0.5 
3. Time Deposits: increase(—) 
decrease ( + ) 433.1 519.4 —86.3 
4. Net position of the private 
sector 375.7 385.1 +9.4 
B. Government Sector: 
1. Banks' investment in govern-
ment securities 651.1 705.8 + 54.7 
2. Banks' loans to government N.A. N .A. N.A. 
3. S.B.P. holding of government 
securities 2005.9 2152.9 + 147.0 
4. S.B.P. loans to government 74.8 53.5 —21.3 
5. Accumulation (—) or 
decumulation ( + ) of 
cash balances. 
Central Government 172.2 107.3 + 64.9 
Provincial Government 27.2 64.2 —37.0 
6. Net position of t he govern-
ment sector 2532.4 2740.7 + 208.3 
C. Foreign Sector: 630.5 696.4 + 65.9 
D. Other Items: 101.7 80.9 —20.8 
M O N E Y SUPPLY 3640.3 3903.1 + 262.8 
4 1 
TABLE 3 
Money Supply anil its Causative Factors 
1 9 5 2 - 5 3 
(Rs. in Million) 
Direction Net 
Causative Factors June June of change 
1955 1956 Change in each 
sector 
A. Private Sector: 
1. Banks' loans to private sector 884.1 993.1 + 109.0 
2. Banks' investment in private 
securities 20.4 19.9 —0.5 
3. Time Deposits: increase (—) 
decrease ( + ) 519.4 563.8 —44.4 
4. Net position of the private 
sector 385.1 449.2 + 64.1 
B. Government Sector: 
1. Banks' investment in govern-
ment securities ... 705.8 800.4 + 94.6 
2. Banks ' loan to government .. N.A. N .A . 1 N.A. 
3. S.B.P. holding of government 
securities 2152.9 2264.6 111.7 
+ 344.62 
= +456.3 
4. S.B.P. loans to government 53.5 — —53.5 
5. Accumulation (—) or 
decumulation ( + ) o f 
cash balances. 
Central Government 107.3 250.5 —143.2 
Provincial Government ... 64.2 82.3 —18.1 
6. Net position of the govern-
ment sector 2740.7 2732.2 —8.5 
+ 334.6 
: +336-12 
C. Foreign Sector 696.4 1394.5 + 698.1 
—344.6 
•= + 353.52 
D. Other Items: 80.9 —19.4 — 100.3 
M O N E Y SUPPLY 3903.1 4556.5 + 653.4 
1 The figure for June 1956 is available but since the corresponding figure for 
June 1955 is not known this figure has not been included in column for June 
1956. 
2Devaluation of the rupee in July 1955 resulted in an appreciation in the rupee 
value of foreign assets held by S.B.P. These paper profits amounting to Rs. 344.6 
million were used to retire a part of the outstanding debt of the government 
to the S.B.P. To this extent the available figures overstate the expansionai^ 
influence of foreign sector in money supply and understate the extent of deficit 
financing in 1955-56. In the above table an adjustment has been made in both 
items to bring out the real position of both sectors. 
4 2 
T A B L E 3 
Money Supply anil its Causative Factors 
1952-53 
(Rs. in Million) 
Causative Factors June 
1956 
June 
1957 
Direction 
of 
Change 
Net 
change 
in e tch 
sector 
Private Sector: 
1. Banks' loans to private sector 915.6 1155.8 + 240.2 
2. Banks' investment in private 
securities 19.9 16.7 —3.2 
3. Time Deposits: increase (—) 
decrease ( + ) 563.8 568.6 —4.8 
4. Net position of the private 
sector 371.7 603.9 + 232.2 
Government Sector: 
1. Banks' investment in govern-
ment securities ... 800.4 810.2 + 9.8 
2. Banks' loans to government 77.5 54.4 —23.1 
3. S.B.P. holding of government 
securities 2264.6 3036.6 + 772.0 
4. S.B.P. loans to government — — — 
5. Accumulation (—) or 
decumulation ( + ) of cash 
balances 
Central Government 
Provincial Government ... 
250.5 
82.3 
622.8 
50.6 
—372.3 
+ 31.7 
6. Net position of the govern-
ment sector 2809.7 3227.8 + 418.1 
c. Foreign Sector: 1394.5 1200.5 —194.0 
D. Other Items: —19.4 —21.7 —2.3 
M O N E Y SUPPLY 4556.5 5010.5 + 454.0 
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TABLE 3 
Money Supply anil its Causative Factors 
1952-53 
(Rs. in Million) 
Causative Factors June 
1957 
June 
1958 
Direction 
of 
Change 
Net 
change 
in each 
sector 
A. Private Sector: 
1. Banks' loans to private sector 1155.8 1184.8 + 29.0 
2. Banks' investment in private 
securities 16.7 29.2 + 12.5 
3. Time Deposits: increase (—) 
decrease ( + ) 568.6 700.2 —131.6 
4. Net position of the private 
sector 603.9 513.8 —90.1 
B. Government Sector: 
1. Banks' investment in govern-
ment securities 810.2 980.9 +170.7 
2. Banks' loans to government 54.4 118.2 + 63.8 
3. S.B.P. holding of government 
securities 3036.6 3604.0 + 567.4 
4. S.B.P. loans to government — 110.3 + 110.3 
5. Accumulation (—) or 
decumulation ( + ) of cash 
balances 
Central Government 622.8 817.1 —194.3 
Provincial Government 50.6 — + 50.6 
6. Net position of the govern-
ment Sector 3227.8 3996.3 + 768.5 
C. Foreign Sector: 1200.5 880.5 —320.0 
D. Other Items: —21.7 —28.7 —7.0 
M O N E Y SUPPLY 5010.5 5361.9 + 351.4 
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T A B L E 3 
Money Supply anil its Causative Factors 
1 9 5 2 - 5 3 
(Rs. in Million) 
Causative Factors June 
1958 
June 
1959 
Direction 
of 
Change 
Net 
change 
in each 
sector 
A. Private Sector: 
1. Banks' loans to private sector 1184.8 1178.5 —6.3 
2. Banks' investment in private 
securities 29.2 31.3 + 2.1 
3. Time Deposits: increase (—) 
decrease ( + ) 700.2 753.4 —53.2 
4. Net position of the private 
sector 513.8 456.4 —57.4 
B. Government Sector: 
1. Banks' investment in govern-
ment securities 980.9 1093.6 + 112.7 
2. Banks' loans to government 118.2 201.0 + 82.8 
3. S.B.P. holding of government 
securities 3604.0 3623.5 + 19.5 
4. S.B.P loans to government 110.3 86.5 —23.8 
5. Accumulation (—) or 
decumulation ( + ) of 
cash balances 
Central Government 817.1 829.2 —12.1 
Provincial Government ... — 16.8 —16.8 
6. Net position of the govern-
ment sector 3996.3 4158.6 +162.3 
C. Foreign Sector: 880.5 1043.2 + 162.7 
D. Other Items: —28.7 —98.4 —69.7 
MONEY SUPPLY 5361.9 5559.8 + 197.9 
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TABLE 1 0 
Money Supply and its Causative Factors 
1959-60 
(Rs. in Million) 
Causative Factors June 
1959 
June 
1960 
Direction 
of 
Change 
Net 
change 
in each 
sector 
A. Private Sector: 
1. Banks' loans to private sector 1178.5 1535.8 + 357.3 
2. Banks' investment in private 
securities 31.3 31.5 + 0.2 
3. Time Deposit: increase (—) 
decrease ( + ) 753.4 946.0 —193.0 
4. Net position of the private 
sector 456.4 621.3 + 164.9 
B. Government Sector: 
1. Banks' investment in govern-
ment securities.. . 1093.6 1199.7 + 106.1 
2. Banks' loans to government 201.0 159.1 —41.9 
3. 
4. 
S.B.P. holding of government 
securities 
S.B.P. loans to government 
3623.5 
86.5 
3625.8 
72.2 
+ 2.3—61.9 
= —59.61 
—14.3 
5. Accumulation (—) or 
decumulation ( + ) of 
cash balances. ... 
6. 
Central Government 
Provincial Government .. 
Net position of the govern-
ment sector 
829.2 
16.8 
4158.6 
842.2 
6.4 
4208.2 
—13.0 
+ 10.4 
+ 48.6 
—61.9 
—12.31 
C. Foreign Sector: 1043.2 1169.6 + 126.4+61.9 
= 188.31 
D. Other Itmes: —98.4 — 143.3 —44.9 
MONEY SUPPLY 5559.8 5855.8 + 296.0 
Un pursuance of 50% increase in Pakistan quota a payment of Rs. 61.9 
million has been made to I .M.F. This liability has been met by the issue of 
ad-hoc treasury bills in favour of S.B.P. Hence a corresponding adjustment 
has been made in the government and foreign sectors. 
A P P E N D I X B 
METHOD OF CALCULATION OF MONEY SUPPLY AND ITS 
CAUSATIVE FACTORS 
ABBREVIATIONS 
R.C.& F. Report on Currency and Finance. State Bank of 
Pakistan. 
S.B.P. State Bank of Pakistan. 
Com. Bank Commercial Banks (Scheduled). 
Tab. Table 
Col. Column. 
N.B.: Any reference to R.C. & F. will mean a reference to the R.C. 
& F. 1958-59, unless otherwise stated. 
(A) Private Sector 
1. Bank's loans to private sector. All figures up to 1955-56 are 
obtained from the balance sheets of the Com. Banks by adding 
"Advances"and "Bills purchased and discounted" (Cols. 2 0 + 2 1 =Co l 
22 of tab. 20, R.C.&F.). 
N o separate estimate is available for the Com. Banks' loans to 
Central and Provincial governments till the year 1955-56, so that 
up to that year figures for Com. Banks' loans to private sector also 
include their loans to Governments (which, however, are believed 
to have been small). Separate figures for Com. Banks' loans to 
governments and to the private sector are, however, available from 
the year 1956-57. (R.C.&F., 1957-58 and 1958-59: Section on "Money 
and Banking", under the heading "Bank Credit") . 
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2. Banks' Investment in Private Securities. Figures are obtained 
from the column on "Other Investments" in the balance sheet of the 
Com. Banks (Col. 19 of tab. 20, R.C.& F). Separate figures being 
available only from 1954 on, this figure is assumed zero for 1951-53. 
3. Time Deposits. Data are obtained f rom the balance sheet of 
the Com. Banks by subtracting "Inter Bank Time Borrowings and 
Time Deposits" from "Total time liabilities in Pakistan" (cols. 9 
minus 6 plus 7 = col. 8 of tab. 20., R.C.&F.). 
(B) Government Sector 
1. Banks' Investment in Government Securities. U p to 1953-54 
data are obtained by subtracting the Com. Banks' "Cash in tills", 
"Reserves with S.B.P." and total of Com. Banks "Advances" and 
"Bills purchased and discounted" from the "total liabilities" of Com. 
Banks and then adding "other Loans and Advances" of S.B.P. to this 
figure (col. 10, tab. 20) minus (co l s ,12+13+22of tab. 20) plus (col. 17, 
tabl 17, R.C.&F.). From 1954-55, data are obtained from balance 
sheets of the Com. Banks where it is shown separately as investment 
in Central and Provincial government securities, (cols. 17 and 18, 
tab. 20, R.C.&F.). 
2. Banks' loans to Governments. For explanation see the note 
on "Banks ' loans to private sector" above. 
3. S.B.P. holding of Government Securities. To find this, the 
total "Gold, Dollar and Sterling reserves held and controlled by 
S.B.P." (tab. 76, R.C.&F.) are subtracted from the total of the follow-
ing items: 
Total Gold & Foreign Assets of S.B.P. (Col. 9, tab. 15, R.C.&F.) 
+ T o t a l Assets with Reserve Bank of India (col. 17, tab. 15, R.C.&F.) 
+S .B .P . Balances held outside Pakistan (col. 14, tab. 17, R .C .&F. )+ 
S.B.P. Investments (col. 18, tab. 17, R .C .&F. )+o the r Assets of S.B.P. 
(col. 19, tab. 17, R .C.&F. )+Government of Pakistan securities held 
by S.B.P. (col. 11, tab. 15, R . C . & F . ) + Treasury Bills held by S.B.P. 
(col. 13, tab. 17, R .C .&F. )+Rupee Coins in the Issue Department 
of S.B.P. (col. 10, tab. 15, R .C .&F. )+Coins in the Banking Depart-
ment of S.B.P. (col. 12, tab. 17, R.C.&F.) . 
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4. S.B.P. loans to Government. Figures for "Provincial Gov-
ernment Debtor Balances" and "Loans and Advances to Govern-
ments" have been added from S.B.P. Banking Department balance 
sheet, (cols. 15 & 16, tab. 17. R.C.&F.). 
5. Cash Balances of Central and Provincial Governments. 
Figures for the "S.B.P. liabilities to the Central & Provincial Govts." 
have been added from the S.B.P. Banking Department balance sheet 
(cols. 3 & 4, tab. 17, R.C.&F.). 
(C) Foreign Sector 
Figures are obtained from the table on "Gold, Dollar & Sterling 
Reserves held & controlled by S.B.P." (tab. 76, R.C. & F.). 
(D) Other Items 
The following are included through 1953-54: 
minus Capital & Reserve Fund of S.B.P. (cols. 1 & 2, tab. 17) 
minus "Bills payable" by S.B.P. (col. 8, tab. 17, R.C. & F.) 
minus "other liabilities" of S.B.P. (col. 9, tab. 17, R.C. & F.) 
minus Deposits of Banks in S.B.P. (col. 5, tab. 17, R.C. & F.) 
plus Reserves of Banks with S.B.P. (col. 13, tab. 20, R.C. & F.) 
minus "Interbank demand liabilities" (cols. 2 & 3, tab. 20 
R.C. & F.) minus Interbank time liabilities (cols. 6 & 7, 
tab. 20, R. C. & F.) minus Deposits of I .M.F., A/C. No . 1. 
plus total amount of coinage in circulation. 
From the year 1954-55 on, it also includes a residual item, 
calculated so as to balance the Com. Banks' balance sheets. 
Deposits of I .M.F. A/C No. I have been calculated by sub-
tracting "other Deposits with S.B.P. excluding I .M.F. , A/C 
No. 1" (tab. 29, R.C. & F.) from "other deposits" in S.B.P. 
(col. 6, tab. 17, R.C. & F.). 
1. All figures are of the last Friday of June of each year except 
the State Bank figures of 1959-60 which are of the last day of June 
1960. 
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2. The Com. bank figures for the year 1959-60 are taken from 
the Sunday Morning News—July 3, 1960. 
3. The S.B.P. figures for the year 1959-60 are taken for Annual 
Report, 1959-60, S.B.P. 
4. Counterpart funds have been included in cash balances of the 
Central Government. 
5. Coinage held by the S.B.P. is considered part of their hold-
ings of government securities, coinage held by the Com. Banks is 
not. 
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APPENDIX D 
The formulae of Part II for the credit-creation coefficients are 
derived in this appendix. Let the balance sheets of the State Bank 
and the Scheduled Banks be written as follows: 
Stale Bank Commercial Banks 
Assets Liabilities Assets Liabilities 
Foreign 
Exchange = F 
Reserves of 
Banks = R 
Currency in 
Hand = C 
Demand Depo 
sits = D 
Government 
Securities = 
Notes in Circu-
lation = N 
Reserves in 
SBP = R 
Time Depo-
sits = T 
Other Assets 
less other 
liabilities = A 
Other Deposits 
= S 
All other Assets 
less other liabi-
lities = X + L + 
G i — G 2 
Two definitions of the money supply will be used: (1) the sum of 
notes in circulation, demand deposits (of other than governments or 
banks), and coinage in circulation, less notes and coins in banks, 
i.e., M = N + D + S + J — C (J is coins in circulation); and (2) the 
above quantities plus time deposits, i.e., M ' = M + T . 
Five assumptions are made: 
1. Time deposits change proportionately with demand deposits: 
T = t D (t > o) 
2. Demand deposits change proportionately with the money 
supply: 
d 
D = d M (or D = M ' ) (o < d < 1) 
1 + t d 
3. The Scheduled Banks conceive of a desirable cash-plus-
reserves ratio and never permit the actual ratio to deviate 
from it: 
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1 + t d 
c' = 
1— d — e + b 2 d = b 2 t d 
Thus : (1) a rise in t will lower c but will raise c' (provided the 
cash requirements on time deposits are lower than those 
on demand deposits, i.e., b 2 < b j ) . 
(2) a rise in b 2 and/or b 2 will reduce both credit-creation 
coefficients. 
(3) a rise in d and/or e will increase both coefficients. 
There are two procedures by which we can give numerical values 
to these credit-creation coefficients: by looking at actual values of 
t, d, r, and e over the past decade (remembering that it is marginal, 
not average, values that are relevant) or by making estimates on the 
basis of our general knowledge of the banking system. In columns 
(1) through (4) of Table D- l below, the values of the parameters are 
computed (from changes) for several periods within June 1951—June 
1960. In columns (5) and (6), c and c' are evaluated at those para-
meter values; the actual credit-creation coefficients for the period 
are given in the parentheses (the difference results from the real world's 
violation of assumption 5—other assets of the State Bank vary slightly 
from year to year—and from other simplifications of the theory). 
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TABLE D-L 
Period 
(July-June) 
(1) 
t 
(2) 
d 
(3) 
r 
(4) 
e 
(5) 
c 
(6) 
c ' 
1951-60 .74 .33 .02 .05 1.62(1.65) 2.02(2.04) 
1951-55 1.41 .23 .05 .10 1.48(1.68) 1.98(2.20) 
1955-60 .59 .37 .01 .04 1.67(1.64) 2.03(1.98) 
1955-58 .43 .29 .02 .05 (1.49(1.43) 1.84(1.60) 
1958-60 .80 .62 —.01 —.00* 2.65(2.65) 3.96(3.76) 
Value in 
June 1960** .47 .34 .12 .05 
*Less than .005 in absolute value. 
**For changes between years, t = (change in time deposits over the period) 
-Hchange in demand deposits over the period). The last row figure (.47) is the 
ratio of time deposits in June 1960 to demand deposits in June 1960, an average 
(rather than marginal) concept, d, r, and e are similary calculated. 
Most of the sub-period vagaries of c and c' can be understood 
by looking at t, d, r and e in this table. The low values (less than 
1.50) of c over 1951-55 and 1955-58 result f rom the low values of d 
(less than .30) in these years. The value of c' does not fall by so much 
as that of c for 1951-55 because of the high value of t. Both c and c' 
rise greatly over 1958-60 because both d and t are much higher than 
in the preceding three years and r is actually negative. 
This phenomenon of negative values of r and e indicates the 
danger of using estimates based on changes over time to predict 
changes within a particular time period. Certainly no one would 
suggest that, in the future, rises in deposits will be accompanied by 
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falls in banks' cash-plus-reserves. Neglecting this secular rise in t 
and decline in r, we can suggest that the values of these parameters 
(vis-a-vis changes within a particular year) were about : 
t = .40 
d = .33 
r = .13* 
e = .05 
Using these values, the "probable" credit-creation coefficients 
over the period 1951-60 can be calculated: 
c = 1.51 
c' = 1.71 
These are the figures used in the text. One can also calculate: 
A D 
= dc = .50 
A ( F + G 2 ) 
A ( J + N — C ) (assuming A S =0) 
= ( 1 — d ) c = 1.01 
A ( F + G 2 ) 
A T 
tdc = .20 
A ( F + G 2 ) 
* r = . 1 3 if banks carry cash-plus-reserves of 5 % of total deposits in addition 
to legally required reserves (with t = . 4 0 ) ; r = .13 also if cash-plus-excess reserves 
are 4 % of total deposits and t = . 6 5 (this seems closer to the Planning Commission 
thinking (c/. Part IV). 
APPENDIX E 
D R . RICHARD C . PORTFR* 
The relevance to monetary expansion of the two definitions of 
deficit financing will be examined in this appendix. It will be shown 
that , under different circumstances, any one of three formulas may be 
relevant to the prediction, or explanation, of the money supply. 
Accordingly, either definition of deficit financing may be the appro-
priate multiplicand of a credit-creation coefficient. The assump-
tions underlying the "causative" analysis of Part I and the "credit-
creation coefficient" analysis of Part II are made explicit. 
In order to indicate these various circumstances, an extremely 
simplified model of the banking system is examined. It is assumed 
that the State Bank holds no assets other than government securities, 
that no currency circulates, that no bank has capital or fixed assets, 
and that the commercial banks do not accept time deposits.1 Then 
the balance sheets of the State Bank and the commercial banks are as 
follows: 
State Batik Commercial Banks 
Assets Liabilities Assets Liabilities 
Government Se- Bank Reserves Bank Reserves Deposits = D 
curities = G 2 = R = R 
Government Se-
curities = GI— 
G2 
Private 
Advances = L 
where the change in is deficit financing by the first definition (i.e., 
the sum of G 2 and ( G j — G 2 ) , and the change in G 2 deficit financing 
^Research Adviser, Inst i tute of Development Economics. 
'These assumptions greatly simplify the algebra but do no t affect the validity 
of the conclusions. 
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by the second definition. By the definition of equality of assets and 
liabilities, it must be true that 
E- l ) R = G 2 
E-2) D = G i + L 
Since deposits, under ou r simple assumptions, comprise the entire 
money supply, one can always "explain" the size of the money supply 
by means of equation (E—2), D = G i + L . This is, of course, not an 
explanation but an identity. The "causative" or "balancing" analysis 
of Part I makes use of this accounting relation, (E-2). This "causative" 
analysis, it should be noticed, makes use of the first definition of deficit 
financing (Gi ) . 
In Part II, distinction is made between endogenous and exogenous 
variables (i.e., variables determined within and outside the system, 
respectively), and also behavioral assumptions about the commercial 
banks are introduced. It then becomes possible for the second defini-
tion of deficit financing to be relevant to the explanation of the money 
supply. The remainder of this Appendix is concerned with the 
different circumstances under which each of the two definitions of 
deficit financing is relevant. 
In an economy such as Pakistan's, there are three possible cons-
traints upon commercial bank behavior. First, the banks must 
maintain a reserve ratio by law (and by custom and convenience one 
slightly greater than the legal ratio): 
E-3) R > i D (r > 0) 
Second, the banks must, by law, maintain an adequate liquidity 
position: 
E-4) R + G j — G 2 > s D (s > r ) 2 
And third, taking the structure of interest rates as given and inflexible 
in the short-run, there exists a limit to the amount of credit-worthy 
private advances banks can make: 
2By use of equation (E-l) , this constraint may be reduced to: 
G t > sD . 
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E-5) L < L° 
where L° is this maximum amount of advances. The superscript 
zero (as in L°) will be used in this Appendix to denote an exogenous 
variable. 
There is of course the further set of constraints, that none of 
these asset variables may be negative. 
Some additional assumptions about the commercial banks ' beha-
vior are needed. Very simply, it is assumed that the banks prefer to 
hold, for reasons of earnings, private advances, government securities 
and reserves in that order. Only if no expansion of advances were 
possible (i.e., L =L°) would they hold government securities in amounts 
greater than required to satisfy their liquidity requirements; and only 
if government securities were unavailable would they hold excess 
reserves. In mathematical terminology, this assumption may be 
summarized as follows: the commercial banks are assumed to maxi-
mize the lexicographic ordering of L, (G i—G 2 ) , and R. More briefly 
still, they choose: 
E - 6 ) M a x ( L , G i — G 2 , R ) 
lex 
subject to the constraints imposed on them. 
We can distinguish five basic sets of circumstances in which the 
system may operate: 
I. Where government policy sets the total deficit finance, but not 
its composition: 
E - 7 ) G j = G ° i 
0 < G 2 < G ° i 
The inequality merely requires that the securities holdings of both the 
commercial banks and the State Bank be positive. 
II. Where government policy not only sets the total deficit 
finance but also puts limits on the amount of government securities the 
State Bank will purchase: 
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E - 8 ) G I = G ° , 
O < G 2 < G ° 2 
Circumstances I are clearly the special case of II where G ° 2 = G ° I . 
III . Where government policy not only sets the total deficit 
financing but also puts limits on the amount of government securities 
the commercial banks will be permitted to purchase: 
E - 9 ) G ! = G ° I 
0 < G ° i — G 2 < G ° I — G ° 2 o r G ° 2 < G 2 < G 0 , 
Circumstances I are clearly the special case of III where G 2 ° =0. 
IV. Where government policy sets only the amount of deficit 
financing to be done through the State Bank: 
E - 1 0 ) G 2 = G ° 2 
G ° 2 < G ! 
V. Where government policy sets both the total deficit financing 
and the composi t ion of itsholding by the State Bank and commercial 
banks: 
E- l 1) G j = G ° i 
G 2 = G ° 2 
It should be noted that those circumstances in which the gov-
ernment sets lower limits to the commercial banks ' holdings of gov-
ernment securities may be difficult to attain if the State Bank also 
fixes the price of such securities; thus circumstances II and V may 
require significant change in yields on government securities if they 
are to be implemented. Similarly, those circumstances which set upper 
limits on commercial banks ' government securities holdings (i.e., cir-
cumstances I and II) may require additional measures to keep the 
commercial banks f rom buying securities f rom the non-bank public, 
thus raising G i . 
The first set of circumstances (I) will be analysed in detail. The 
results of the other circumstances, being similarly derived, will be 
given without proof. 
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The problem is a simple linear-program. The commercial banks 
act as if to achieve: 
E-6) Max (L, G ! — G 2 , R) 
lex 
subject to a set of linear constraints: 
(i) G 2 < G ! from (E-7) 
(ii) L < L ° from (E-5) 
E-12) (iii) G ! > sD f rom (E-4) 
(iv) R > rD f rom (E-3) 
and subject to non-negativity of the variables. Using the equalities 
of (E-l), (E-2), and (E-7) to eliminate R, D, and G | , the constraints 
(E-12) become: 
(i) G 2 — G ° ! < 0 
(ii) L—L° < 0 
E-l3) (iii) L < 0 
(iv) r L + r G ° ! — G 2 < 0 
Graphically, the problem may be seen in the following diagram. 
The four constraints, labelled (i) through (iv), are drawn as equalities, 
with the variables of the system, G 2 and L, as axes. 
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The feasible solution space (i.e., where none of the four constraints 
are violated) is enclosed by the shading. Lexicographic maximization 
requires that one move to the right (to larger values of L) as far as 
possible, and then down (to lower values of G 2 , i.e., higher values of 
(G° i—G 2 ) ), as far as possible. In the diagram this maximum exists 
at the intersection of constraints (ii) and (iv). This, however, is not 
the only possible solution; if constraint (iii) moved sufficiently to 
the left, the intersection of it and (iv) would become the solution. 
N o other solution is possible.3 
s 
The first case (pictured above) occurs if G ° i > j—- L°, the 
g 
second case if G ° i < — s L° 4 . These two cases may be given 
economic interpretation. In the first case, the banks are constrained 
from further increasing advances by the lack of credit-worthy borro-
wers; in the second case, they are constrained by the necessity of 
maintaining their liquidity position. In each case, a formula maybe 
derived for the money supply, D, in terms oftheexogeneous variable.5 
1-1. i f G ° i > 
D = G 0 ! + L° 
1-2 . i f G ° 1 < p - i L ° , 
D = — G ° i s 1 
In both these cases, 1-1 and 1-2, it is the first definition of deficit finan-
cing (Gi ) that is relevant to the determination of the money supply. 
In case 1-1, a change in G ° i , ceteris paribus, leads to a change in D by 
an equal amount (i.e., the credit-creation coefficient, or multiplier, of 
3The apparent solution at the intersection of (i) and (iv) cannot occur 
provided s > r (as is assumed). 
s 
4Both cases apply if G° i L° and both yield the same value for money 
1—s 
supply. Hereafter, the "equal to" sign is omitted. 
5 0 n e or more other formulas may be found in terms of endogenous vari-
ables but these are not meaningful (in the sense of aiding prediction); for example, 
1 
in case 1, G2, but G2 is endogenous ( = r G i ° + rL°). 
r 
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an increase in deficit financing, by the first definition, is unity); a 
change in L°, ceteris paribus, also leads to an equal change in D. In 
case 1-2, a change in G° i induces a larger change of D, the credit-crea-
tion coefficient being 1/s; a change in L° does not affect D. Thus, 
in circumstances I, it is always the first definition of deficit finance ( G ( ) 
that is the meaningful determinant of the money supply. That this 
is not so under all circumstances will be seen below. 
Circumstances II differ f rom I only in the replacement of cons-
traint (i) of (E-l3) by: 
E-l4) (i) G 2 — G ° 2 < 0 (see E-8) 
Optimum solutions may now occur at any of three combinations of 
constraints, (i) and (iv), (ii) and (iv), or (iii) and (iv): 
I I- l . if G ° ! > - j r G ° 2 — L ° and G°i > 
D = — G°2 
r 
s 1 
II-2. if L ° < G ° i < — G ° 2 — L ° , 
1—s r 
D = G ° i + L ° 
. II-3. i f G ° ! < — G ° 2 and G°i < ~ L°, r i s 
D = — L G ° ! 
s 
Note that, in case I I - l , the second definition of deficit financing is the 
relevant one. 
Circumstances III differ from I only in the addition of a fifth 
constraint to (E-13) 
E-l5) (v) G° 2 —G2 < 0 (see E-9) 
Optimum solutions may occur at any of four combinations of cons-
traints, (ii) and (iv), (iii) and (iv), (ii) and (v), or (iii) and (v): 
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VI. if ~ ~ L° < G°1 < - J L G°2— L". 
1 — s r 
D = G ° i + L ° 
V-2. if G°x < L° and G ° ! < G ° 2 , 1—s r 
D = — — G ° i 
s 
V-3. if G ° , > — G°2—L° and G ° ! > — G ° 2 , r r 
D = — G ° 2 r 
The findings in these five circumstances may be summarized. 
In five cases, the appropriate formula is D = G ° i + L ° ; then the "cau-
sative"analysis of Part I yields not only a definitionally correct formula 
for money supply but also a meaningful explanatory formula. If G i 
a n d L are exogenous and known (i.e., G i = G ° iand L =L°) , the analysis 
of Part I cannot be improved by analysis of credit-creation coefficients 
(as in Part II). In five other cases, D = ( l / s ) G ° i , implying that a 
"liquidity" (or "secondary reserve") coefficient is relevant. And in 
the other four cases, D = ( l / r ) G ° 2 , implying that a "cash" (or "pri-
mary-reserve") coefficient is relevant. This taxonomic approach shows 
tha t sometimes the first definition of deficit financing ( G j ) is relevant 
and sometimes the second (G2). 
In part II, a more complex version of this last named coefficient 
(1/r) is computed and analysed. " W h y ? " may very well be asked, 
for it applies in less than a third of the fourteen cases worked out 
above. To answer this, attention must be turned away from these 
idealized circumstances to the world of reality. Two empirical obser-
vations are made: m 
(1) The commercial banks of Pakistan have not been constrained 
over the past decade by their liquidity position, and as not likely 
to become so constrained in the near future. Thus, the cases which 
involve constraint (iii), i.e., G ! =sD , are unrealistic, and need not be 
further considered. 
(2) The commercial banks of Pakistan have not held "primary 
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rseerves" (i.e., cash plus State Bank deposits) in excess of what is 
probably a minimum.7 Thus, any case which does not involve 
constraint (iv), i.e., R = r D , is unrealistic and may be neglected. 
This elimination process leaves only six cases: 
I-1. where D = G ° + L ° 
II-1 where D = (1/r) G° 
II-2. where D = G ° + L ° 
I I I - l . where D = G ° + L ° 
IV-2. where D = (l/r)G° 
V-3. where D = (l/r)G° 
In cases I—1, II—2, and III—1, G i is fixed (at G°) and potential 
advances are exhausted by the banks ( L = L ° ) ; in cases II—1, IV—2, 
and V—3, the limit to deposit expansion is the banks' lack of excess 
primary reserves (cash plus State Bank deposits). 
While any one of these cases may possibly be relevant in the 
near future, it is not impossible to discover which has been relevant 
in the past. During 1951-60, government policy did not actively 
determine G 2 but only G i ; the commercial banks were permitted 
wide discretion in the amount of government securities they held 
( G r G 2 ) . In other words fiscal policy, which traditionally determines 
G i = G ° , was active while monetary policy, traditionally concerned 
with G 2 , was passive. Thus, case 1-1 (or perhaps III-l) , may be said 
probably to have been operative, and the "causative" analysis, D — 
G ° + L ° , is the best means of explanation of the size of the money 
supply during this period. If this type of policy were to continue, 
the money supply would only partially be under the control of gov-
ernment policy (i.e., in that government policy sets G°) and would 
^During the busy season; around June—Sept. , slack in their reserve posi-
t ion often appears. There has been a gradual reduction of their cash-plus-
reserves-to-deposits ratio over 1951-60, but there appears to be little room for 
fur ther economization. 
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partially be under the control of the commercial banks and their 
private borrowers (who determine L°). It would also be true that 
D =( l / r ) G2, but this is irrelevant since G 2 would not be determined 
by government policy. 
It is possible that government policy will be(and perhaps has been 
becoming in the last two years) somewhat more concerned with G 2 
in the future. Only if this is true is the money supply determined 
completely by government policy, for if G 2 = G ° as well as G[ = G ° 
(case V-3), then D = (1/r) G^ and L° is not even a partial determinant 
of the money supply.8 The relationship between deficit financing and 
the money supply can only be completely determined if government 
policy is assumed to set G 2 = G°. It is this assumption that makes 
Part II relevant; without it, the relationship between deficit financing, 
under either definition, and the money supply is less than completely 
determinate (dependent, in part, on L°). 
While G 2 has not generally been determined by government 
policy in the past, we can nevertheless discover the relationship 
between it and money supply (i.e.,D = ( l / r ) G 2 ) for that period. If it is 
assumed that the relationship between the money supply and deficit 
financing (second definition) would not change if government policy 
were to begin to determine G 2 , then the passive experience of the past 
decade may help the active planning of the future. It is for this reason 
that the credit-creation coefficients of Part II are calculated. 
»In case IV-2, where G 2 = G 0 2 and G i > G° 2 , it is also t rue that D = ( l / r ) G ° 2 . 
6 7 
APPENDIX F 
oo 
Rate of Growth of the Monetized Sector 
(Million Rupees) 
r 1951-52 1952-53 1953-54 1954-55 1955-56 1956-57 1957-58 1958-59 
Value of Food Crops ... 4421 4417 5275 4823 4354 5227 4926 4684 
h - 8 0 % o f ( l ) * 3536.8 3533.6 4218.4 3858.4 3483.2 4181.6 3940.6 3747.2 
3. Value of livestock 2369 2415 2415 2584 2597 2607 2623 2636 
20% of (3)* 473.8 483 0 483.0 516.8 519.4 521.8 524.6 527.2 
:5. Non-monetized Sector, (2) + (4) ... 4010.6 4016.6 4701.4 4375.2 4002.6 47C3.4 4465:2 4274.4 
6. Total National Income 18161 18482 19447 19857 19516 20785 20987 20917 
-7. Monetized Sector, (6)—(5) 14150.4 14465.4 14745.6 15481.8 15513.4 16081.6 16521.8 16642.6 
8. Non-moneti7ed Sector as a % of national income 
• (5-i-6) ... 25 24 24 22 21 32 21 20 
• , 1 
* It has been assumed that an unchanging 80% of food crops and 20% of livestock is consumed on the farm on the basis of D r . Baqai's 
article, "Multiplier Erocess in an underdeveoped Economy". Selected Papers on Pakistan Economy, State Bank of Pakistan, Vol. 3, 
i 1958. " - ' 
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